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1 Introduction 
The novelty of Ellmann’s paper derives primarily from the fact that
it moves beyond the separation of powers and counter-majoritarian
based critiques and analyses that have dominated academic discourse
about South African constitutional law. For instance, in the second
edition of the Constitutional law of South Africa, Woolman and Botha
outline the multi-part structure of the fundamental rights analysis.
The authors describe interpretation as characterised by a two-fold
process: determining the meaning or the scope of a fundamental right
followed by a determination of whether the right has been infringed.
In most instances, a finding that the right has been limited leads to
a third stage: limitations analysis. Under section 36, courts are, quite
‘controversially’, given the power to decide whether a democratically
conceived law’s infringement of a fundamental right indeed violates
the Constitution or whether, in fact, the infringement of a right can
be justified.1 This controversial judicial power not only dominated
scholarly work at the eve of the new legal order in 1994,2 but vexed
both jurist and academic alike when it came to the issue of the
1 S Woolman & H Botha ‘Limitations’ in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional law of
South Africa (2nd Edition, OS, July 2006) Chapter 34. 
2 See A Sachs Protecting human rights in a new South Africa (1990); A Sachs ‘A Bill
of Rights for South Africa: Areas of agreement and disagreement’ (1989) 21
Columbia Human Rights Law Review 13; and J Didcott ‘Practical workings of a bill
of rights’ in Van der Westhuizen, (ed) A bill of rights for South Africa (1988) .
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inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights in the Bill of Rights.3 
The essence of Ellmann’s argument is that in addition to the
power of judicial review provided by the express provisions of the
Constitution, the South African Constitutional Court’s achievements
should be understood in light of the values on which the Constitution
is founded. He argues that the judges have an emotional commitment
to these values and have enforced the law with those values clearly
in mind. In this response, I demonstrate, first, that although perhaps
new in the South African context, the discourse Ellmann opens up has
featured in other discussions of the relationship between law and
emotions, and to a certain extent in analyses of the relationship
between law and politics. 
Secondly, I demonstrate that while the approach of the Court may
and should have been influenced by the emotional commitments of
the judges, it has also been influenced by the transnational dialogue
in which the Court has been engaged. The ‘newness’ of the Court has
forced it to seek international recognition by relying on progressive
foreign decisions.4 This ‘newness’ has also freed the Court to
experiment with different pragmatic judicial approaches without
being bogged down by precedent and a well-entrenched doctrine of
stare decisis. 
2 The ‘old’ separation of powers discourse
It is important to preface this response with an elucidation of the ‘old’
discourse. To use the word ‘old’ is not to suggest that the discourse
has been exhausted. ‘Old’ is used here metaphorically to distinguish
it from emerging ‘new’ discourses. The ‘old’ discourse is dominated
by scholarly arguments that either justify or oppose judicial
invalidation of the decisions of democratically elected branches of
government. Proponents of judicial invalidation have concentrated on
demonstrating that the courts have acted within the confines of the
separation of powers doctrine. The ‘old’ discourse demonstrated
quite clearly that the doctrine of separation of powers does not draw
bright lines between the functions and the powers of each organ or
branch of government. Sandra Liebenberg reckons that not only did
the ‘bounded model’ of separation of powers fail to reflect the reality
3 See D Davis ‘Democracy: Its influence upon the process of constitutional
interpretation’ (1994) 10 South African Journal on Human Rights 103; South
African Law Commission Interim Report on Group and Human Rights, Project 58,
August 1991; South African Law Commission, Final Report on Group and Human
Rights,Project 58, October 1994; and C Sunstein ‘Social and economic rights:
Lessons from South Africa’ (2001) 11 Constitutional Forum 123. 
4 That said, as the Court builds its base of precedents, reliance on foreign decisions
has been on the decline. 
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of modern political processes but also limited the creative
intervention by the judiciary to protect socio-economic rights.5
Liebenberg endorses Martha Minow’s ‘co-operative model’ of
relations between branches of government:
the focus is less on whether one branch has transgressed its boundaries
but rather whether the branches all remain able to participate in the
process of mutually defining their boundaries.6
In the First Certification Judgment, the Constitutional Court
conceived the doctrine in this same, less restrictive sense. The Court
held that no universal model of separation of powers exists,7 and that
the principle of checks and balances mandates necessary intrusion of
one branch into the terrain of another.8 
2.1 The ‘delicate balance’ discourse
Over time, discourse around the doctrine of separation of powers has
moved toward an acknowledgement that the liberal version of the
doctrine of separation of powers does not mean that the judiciary is
not constrained. This recognition moved the debate to the question
of the extent of permissible judicial intrusion.9 The Constitutional
Court in De Lange v Smuts NO and Others10 conceives what it
describes as a ‘distinctively South African model of separation of
powers’ as requiring a delicate balancing:
between the need on the one hand, to control government by separating
powers and enforcing checks and balances and, on the other hand, avoid
diffusing powers so completely that the government is unable to take
timely measures in the public interest.11
In November 2005 the School of Law at the University of the
Witwatersrand organised a high profile symposium to mark the
retirement of Arthur Chaskalson as the Chief Justice of South Africa.
The symposium was entitled: ‘A delicate balance: The place of the
5 S Liebenberg ‘The interpretation of socio-economic rights’ in S Woolman et al
(eds) Constitutional law of South Africa (2nd Edition, OS, December 2003)
Chapter 33. 
6 M Minow Making all the difference: Inclusion, exclusion and American law (1990)
361.
7 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 para 108 (‘Makwanyane’).
8 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 SA 495 at para 109
(‘Certification’). 
9 See P Lenta ‘Judicial restraint and overreach’ (2004) 20 South African Journal on
Human Rights 544; D Davis ‘Adjudicating the socio-economic rights in the South
African Constitution: Towards “deference lite”?’ (2006) 22 South African Journal
on Human Rights 301.
10 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) (‘De Lange’).
11 De Lange (n 10 above) para 60.
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judiciary in a constitutional democracy’. In the preface to a book
containing the edited proceedings of this symposium, the organisers
identify the source of the title as Chaskalson CJ’s farewell speech at
the Constitutional Court.12 The author(s) of the preface deduce from
the farewell speech that one of the challenges that the Constitutional
Court faced was executing its mandate of enforcing a supreme
Constitution against a history of parliamentary supremacy. The
retiring Chief Justice writes: ‘There is a delicate balance between the
judiciary and the other branches of government’ and that maintaining
the balance requires the three arms of government to pay attention
to their inter-relationship.13 
What appears in judicial and academic jurisprudence is that the
extent of the Court’s intrusion is justified by the demand to protect
the Constitution and the values upon which South African society is
based. In this regard, the Court perceives its role as one of
safeguarding the rule of law and the supremacy of the Constitution
against infraction by the other branches.14 Indeed, although the Court
has acknowledged and made use of judicial deference,15 it has been
quick to point to the fact that institutional deference would not be
exercised where the Court is to determine whether the right to
equality (or some other fundamental right) has clearly been
infringed.16 Such principled approaches to constitutional challenges
to existing law also provide evidence of the Court’s unwavering
commitment to the basic law’s deep core values. According to Albie
Sachs (a retired Justice of the Constitutional Court):
When you see yourself as having a constitutional duty to defend deep
core values which are part of emerging world jurisprudence and of
evolving constitutional notions in your own country, you become sharply
aware of the constitutional connection between the maintenance of
judicial independence and the protection of human dignity.17 
The fundamental question that Ellman engages turns on the source of
the values which the judiciary feels obligated to uphold. This question
12 ‘A delicate balance: The place of the judiciary in a constitutional democracy’.
Proceedings of a symposium to mark the retirement of Arthur Chaskalson,
former Chief Justice of the Republic of South Africa (2006).
13 ‘Delicate balance’ (n 12 above) vi. 
14 See P Langa ‘The separation of powers in the South African Constitution’ (2006)
22 South African Journal on Human Rights 5. 
15 See Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs & Others 2004
4 SA 490 (CC).
16 MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal & Ors v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC). For a
discussion of other Constitutional Court cases that engage the subject of
deference see K McLean Constitutional deference, courts and socieo-economic
rights in South Africa (2009) 84 – 88.
17 A Sachs ‘The judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights: The Grootboom case’
in P Jones and K Stokke (eds) Democratising development: The politics of socio-
economic rights in South Africa (2005) 131, 139.
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has not adequately been addressed in South Africa. According to
Ellmann, can we specify the values to which judges should be
committed? A simplistic answer — by reference to the Constitution —
will not do. As Ackermann J notes the Constitution is not a mere
‘super statute’ but rather ‘a quintessential grundnorm or
foundational, generative value system’.18 The South African
Constitution sets out the values upon which the Republic of South
Africa is founded in section 1: (a) human dignity, the achievement of
equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms; (b) non-
racialism and non-sexism; (c) supremacy of the constitution and rule
of law; and (d) universal suffrage, a national common voters roll,
regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government,
to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.19 
What emerges from Ellmann’s paper is that defining constitutional
values is not as simple as it appears. Ellmann alludes to the absence
— or easy identification — of objective normative values to which all
people can or should adhere. One could simply point Ellmann to the
constitutional values outlined above and argue that there they are
clearly and distinctly set out. Indeed, Ellmann himself points to their
existence. The fundamental question posed by Ellman though is what
to make of values so broadly stated:
Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of
human rights and freedoms’ are capacious values; sincere men and
women can surely hold, and reasonably hold, many specific
understandings of these terms.
Even when there seems to be an objective universal document to
which most, if not all, people agree, disagreements may arise during
their practical application. Ellmann offers a spate of recent cases in
which such disagreements arise.20 
As a matter of fact, South African legal scholarship has not
adequately and in a philosophical manner engaged the issue of finding
sources and defining constitutional values. For instance, although
many legal scholars have underscored human dignity as the most
important of the values, they still fall short of giving conclusive and
decisive definitions of what human dignity entails. Nazeem Goolam,
for instance, defines human dignity as ‘a universal human duty, a
18 LWH Ackermann (Justice Emeritus) ‘Opening remarks on ‘A delicate balance: The
place of the judiciary in a constitutional democracy. Proceedings of a symposium
to mark the retirement of Arthur Chaskalson, former Chief Justice of the
Republic of South Africa’ (2006) 8. ‘Delicate balance’ (n 12 above) vi. 
19 Section 1.
20 See for instance CUSA v Tao Ying Metal Industries, 2009 1 BCLR 1 (CC); Wary
Holding Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd, [2008] ZACC 12; Independent Newspaper (Pty) Ltd
v Minister of Intelligence Services 2008 8 BCLR 771 (CC).
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universal human responsibility’.21 Goolam then refers to human
dignity as an ethic of community consistent with non-western
traditions of obligations and responsibilities.22 Liebenberg, for
instance, goes to great length to elaborate the importance of the
value of human dignity from the perspective of the realisation of
socio-economic rights.23 In spite of this, Liebenberg advises the courts
‘to determine how much must be provided, to whom, at what pace
and in what order of priority’.24 Indeed, parts of Liebenberg’s article
provide evidence of how controversial definitions of values can be
because of the varying conceptions of not only what they mean but
their importance in different contexts. For example, Liebenberg
explores the indeterminacy of the value of human dignity and its
potential to promote individualised needs at the expense of
redistributive demands.25 
Defining constitutional values is not an easy task. Ellmann’s
appraisal of some of the deeper factors that complicate the
determination of such definitions runs as follows:
[i]n 15 years, South Africa’s Constitutional Court — and the judges of the
Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Courts — have traversed most of
the history of US constitutional law, a history that took us two centuries
to compile, and have marked out new ground of their own.
He describes the achievements as miraculous: the decisions range
from an early finding of the unconstitutionality of the death penalty;
expansions of freedom of speech; engagement with the Executive’s
handling of foreign relations; novel approaches to administrative
justice; the recognition of equal rights under law for blacks and
whites, gays and straights, men and women; the provision of rights of
public participation in legislative processes; and the development of
socio-economic rights.
The big question for me is whether Ellmann’s paper gives a
sufficient explanatio for and adequately describes the factors that
explain this miraculous achievement. Why did it take the US Supreme
Court fifty years to overrule Plessy v Ferguson, yet after less than two
21 N Goolam ‘Human dignity — Our supreme constitutional value’ (2001) 4
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 43, 46.
22 Goolam (n 21 above) 47 and 48.
23 S Liebenberg ‘The value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights’
(2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 1.
24 Liebenberg (n 23 above) 3. 
25 Liebenberg (n 23 above) 5 – 6. Liebenberg engages a range of different responses
to the meaning of ‘human dignity’: D Davis ‘Equality: The majesty of Legoland
jurisprudence’ (1999) 116 South African Law Journal 398; S Cowen ‘Can “dignity”
guide South Africa’s equality jurisprudence’ (2001) 17 South African Journal on
Human Rights 34; and C Albertyn & B Goldbatt ‘Facing the challenge of
transformation: Difficulties in the development of an indigenous jurisprudence of
equality’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 248.
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years into the new constitutional dispensation the South African
Constitutional Court was deciding Harksen v Lane No and Others.26
Indeed, Brown v Board of Education’s overruling of Plessy was not
immediately understood: its impact was only to be felt later. The
decision was initially only used in education cases and only applied to
other areas to dismantle racial discrimination after some time. In
contrast, Harksen’s impact was immediate. The reasoning in Harksen,
a seemingly private law case, was applied in the 1998 case of National
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of
Justice and Others27 The same reasoning was followed in National
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home
Affairs & Others. Ackermann J held: ‘[I]n dealing with the equality
challenge I shall follow the approach laid down by this Court in various
judgments as summarised in Harksen v Lane No and Others …’.28 
The most intriguing line of argument made by Ellmann to explain
the miraculous achievements is in relation to the role of emotion and
empathy in judging. This argument is made at an especially propitious
moment: a moment of significant change in the personnel on the
Constitutional Court, questions about the true meaning of the notion
of rule of law, the role of the law in giving political direction, and the
intermittent violence making its presence felt at the time of writing. 
3 The ‘new’ discourse: Technical, emotional or 
political adjudication? 
Ellmann’s ideal judge is one who is emotionally attached to the values
he or she seeks to interpret and enforce:
we simply would not feel confident that a judge who shared none of our
values could apply those soundly. How would this judge know what really
mattered to us, if none of it mattered to him?
Ellmann goes to great length and adduces neurological evidence to
prove that as human beings we do not make decisions in an
unemotional manner. He argues that logic alone does not produce
coherent decisions for human minds. In his opinion, the word
‘embrace’ in the statement that constitutional judges should
embrace the values of the constitution is not entirely metaphorical.
Instead, it means to be emotionally attached. And, moreover, this
emotional component is critical to the analysis and the disposition of
the matter. 
26 1998 1 SA 300 (CC).
27 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) (‘NCGLE’).
28 NCGLE (n 27 above) 32 [footnote omitted].
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Although seemingly new in the South African context, the
relationship between law and emotions, from which Ellmann’s
arguments appear founded, has for some time now been the subject
of legal discourse.29 This discourse, directed by legal philosophy,
psychology and neurology, has battled with the argument founded in
Western philosophy to the effect that emotion and reason were
antithetical to one another.30 According to Petty, the long-standing
dichotomy between emotions and rationality in law stand in a marked
contrast to the growing conviction in other disciplines that emotions
and rationality are inextricably and usefully linked.31 Nussbaum
argues a system of law cannot be understood without some reference
to emotions: the emotions indicate what is important to those the law
should protect.32 Petty has gone as far as alluding to the legal
community’s naivety and simplistic understanding as one of the
reasons for the increasing disparity between the ways in which the
legal community and scholars in related fields talk about the role of
emotions in decision making.33 
The legal community’s simplistic understanding looks at emotions
as merely non-cognitive passively experienced mental states.34 This
simplistic understanding of emotions could explain the legal
community’s rejection of emotions as prejudicial, sometimes at the
expense of virtually important emotions.35 Recent scholarly work
however shows that sometimes emotion may be useful and aid the
making of rational decisions. In their argument synthesising article,
Huang and Anderson refer to what they describe as ‘positive
emotions’ that improve aspects of decision-making.36 
Looking at South Africa, it is important to point to the fact that
some of the questions raised and answered by Ellmann mirror issues
discussed in Karl Klare’s seminal article ‘Legal culture and
transformative constitutionalism’.37 Klare’s discussion is premised on
what he describes as ‘transformative constitutionalism’: a phrase
inspired by Etienne Mureinik’s own metaphor in describing the new
legal order as a ‘bridge’ from authoritarianism to ‘a culture of
29 See A Bandes (ed) The passions of law (2000); A Blumenthal ‘Does mood influence
moral judgment? An empirical test with legal and policy implications’ (2005) 29
Law & Psychology Review 1; M Nussbaum Hiding from humanity: Disgust, shame
and the law (2004).
30 E Petty ‘The emotional juror’ (2007) 76 Fordam Law Review 1609, 1609.
31 Petty (n 30 above) at 1612. See also H Huang and J Anderson ‘A psychology of
emotional legal decision making: Revulsion and saving face in legal theory and
practice’ (2006) 90 Minnesota Law Review 1045.
32 Nussbaum ‘Hiding’ (n 29 above), at 5 – 6.
33 Petty (n 30 above) 1613.
34 Petty (n 30 above) 1614.
35 As above. 
36 Huang & Anderson ‘A psychology’ (n 31 above) 1067. 
37 (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 146. 
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justification’.38 Klare takes this Mureinik’s bridge metaphor a step
further. Klare describes ‘transformative constitutionalism’ as a long
term project committed to transforming a country’s social and
political institutions. He writes: ‘an enterprise of inducing large-scale
social change through nonviolent political processes grounded in
law.’39 For Klare, ‘the traditional, bright-line framing of the law/
politics dilemma in adjudication is simplistic.’40 In this regard, clearly
highlighting the role of emotion, Klare illustrates the inevitability of
value judgments in this form of adjudication:
In short, the judge’s personal/political values and sensibilities cannot be
excluded from interpretive processes or adjudication. Not because
judges are weak and give in to political temptation, but because the
exclusion called by the traditional rule-of-law ideal is quite simply
impossible.41 
Klare argues further that: ‘it would be foolish to deny that the judicial
process, especially in the field of constitutional adjudication, calls for
value judgments in which extra-legal considerations may loom
large’.42 Again: the question that animates my reply to Professor
Ellmann inquires into the source and the nature of the emotions that
have guided South African judges. As a matter of fact, emotions
guiding adjudication could also be grounded in negativity and
regression. Additionally, non-uniformity of emotions among judges
can cause sharp disagreements of the kind on display in both ‘turf’
and ‘doctrinal’ battles between the Constitutional Court and the
Supreme Court of Appeal. 
On the face of it, one’s political backgrounds and values may
appear to have no bearing on one’s emotional commitments. As a
matter of fact, however, a person’s political beliefs may be so strong
that they translate into an emotional commitment to protect values
that reflect and enhance such beliefs. 
What has produced coherent adjudication and a situation of rarely
divided judgments from the Constitutional Court is the fact that the
judges share the same political orientation and appear committed to
the same values. This uniformity could be explained by the
backgrounds of the different judges and their lives before coming to
38 See E Mureinik ‘A bridge to where? Introduction to the Interim Bill of Rights’
(1994) 10 South African Journal on Human Rights 31. 
39 Klare (n 37 above) 150.
40 Klare (n 37 above) 160.
41 Klare (n 37 above) 163.
42 See Makwanyane (n 7 above) para 207 (Kriegler J). Klare also quoted Justice
Mokgoro’s dicta, at paras 302 – 4, to the effect that the interpretative task
frequently involves making constitutional choices by balancing competing
fundamental rights and freedoms and that such balancing can only be done by
reference to a system of values extraneous to the text itself. 
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the bench. A quick examination of the members the Constitutional
Court shows that it has been dominated by persons who were
intricately involved in and made immense sacrifices to sustain the
struggle against apartheid. Indeed, as alluded to by Theunis Roux, all
the judges of the Constitutional Court have been either former
African National Congress (ANC) people or sympathetic to ANC’s social
transformation policies.43 In this regard, Roux asserts that far from
being a weakness, this fact has contributed to the Court’s
independence. The connection with the ANC and other liberation
movements gave the Chaskalson Court the ability to say ‘no’ to the
executive and not fear reprisal on the grounds that the judges had a
different political belief set.44  
Ellmann shows that the majority of the judges knew what
mattered to South Africans and that such ‘emotional intelligence’
made it easy for them to embrace the values to which most South
Africans are committed. An examination of some original and current
judges of the Court reveals that the majority have in the past pursued
not only a legal, but also political career, sometimes mixing the two.
This legally and politically engaged bench has imposed its approach
on lower courts — the Supreme Court of Appeal and High Court — that
may not have shared its political and emotional predispositions. The
question of moment, one that hovers over Ellmann’s paper, is
whether the Constitutional Court will ‘stay the course’ as the
composition of its bench changes. (At the time of writing, all of the
original Constitutional Court judges had retired.)
Former Chief Justice, Arthur Chaskalson’s role in the struggle
against the injustices of the apartheid regime is well documented. A
quick perusal of his profile — as summarised on the Constitutional
Court’s website — shows that during Chaskalson’s career at the Bar,
he appeared as counsel on behalf of members of the liberation
movements in several major political trials between 1960 and 1994.
He indeed featured as counsel in the Rivonia Trial in 1963/1964 at
which Nelson Mandela and other leaders of the African National
Congress were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.45 The
profile lists a number of human rights advocacy activities which
Chaskalson has been involved in, including: (i) being a founder
member of the Legal Resources Centre (LRC), a non-profit
organisation formed in 1978 to pursue justice and human rights in
South Africa; (ii) Member of the board of the Centre for Applied Legal
43 T Roux ‘Principle and pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of South Africa’
(2009) 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 106.
44 Roux (n 43 above). 
45 See Constitutional Court website at the following link http://www.constitutional
court.org.za/site/judges/justicearthurchaskalson/index1.html. See also C
Bamberger ‘Introduction of Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson’ (2009) 24 Maryland
Journal of International Law 19.
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Studies from 1979 to 1994; (iii) Member of the National Council of
Lawyers for Human Rights (1980-1991); and (iv) Vice Chairman of the
International Legal Aid Division of the International Bar Association
(1983-1993). Chaskalson has won a number of awards arising from his
work and commitment to the protection of human rights. Just reward
for an advocate perceived by the apartheid government as ‘the
political lawyer’ and thus unsuitable for the bench.46 
At the LRC, Chaskalson litigated a number of cases in which
people were brutalised and framed by the apartheid police and faced
the prospect of the death penalty. With this background, and when
the opportunity presented itself to decide the constitutionality of the
death penalty in Makwanyane, Chaskalson CJ was the most qualified
justice to write the lead judgment: one cannot rule out his being
emotively or even empathetically attached to the case and the
petitioners. The lead judgment reflects a man who knows the nuances
of the criminal justice system and its history of manifest injustice. In
this case, Chaskalson CJ demonstrates that he is not a mere
technician, but appreciates the impact of such social factors as race
and poverty on the outcomes of criminal judicial processes:
It cannot be gainsaid that poverty, race and chance play roles in the
outcome of capital cases and in the final decision as to who should live
and who should die.47
A judge who could perhaps be used to prove beyond doubt Ellmann’s
views on the role of emotion and empathy in judging is Albie Sachs
(now retired from the Constitutional Court). Like Chaskalson, Sachs
was not only a founding member of the Constitutional Court but also
at the centre of the struggle against apartheid. Sachs was himself a
direct victim of the apartheid system, having been detained without
trial a couple of times and physically disabled as a result of an
attempted assassination. Another thing that makes Sachs special is his
political background: he was an ardent member of and active
participant in decision-making of the ANC. During the Judicial Service
Commission interview for a place on the Constitutional Court, Sachs
was asked about his political affiliation and how this history would
influence his decisions as a judge. His answer demonstrates that a
political background may well be viewed as an asset rather than a
liability:
I might say that I do not think that it is a disadvantage to the court to
have a member who has had political experience and I say this with the
confidence ... The test is not whether or not you are being politically
46 G Bizos ‘General Remarks’ at ‘A delicate balance: A symposium to mark the
retirement of Arthur Chaskalson, former Chief Justice of the Republic of South
Africa (n 12 above).
47 Makwanyane (n 7 above) para 51.
156    A response to Stephen Ellmann
active and involved, the test is do you have the independence and the
credibility as a thinker and as a person to work well. And the feeling
there is that if you are going to have somebody who is going to act as a
brake on Parliament, a brake on the executive, it is better to have
people, at least some of the Judges who know the mechanisms and the
working and the thought processes to be able to be most effective in
that respect. It is not enough just to be honourable and clever, you are
working in society and you are relating to other institutions of
Government and a good Constitutional Court functions well within that
context. And I think that from that point of view a little bit of
experience in the world outside of the courts will not be at all damaging
to the court and I will be happy to contribute that.48 
Ellmann’s arguments augment Sachs’ views. Ellmann states that
technical skill alone is not enough: the judge must be committed to
the values society wishes to promote. To Ellmann, the connection
between skill and emotion explains why the framers of the South
African Constitution created the Constitutional Court and staffed it
with judges who shared a passionate rejection of the values of
apartheid. Sachs is an epitome of such a judge. In his own words, he
describes how he has cried twice after judgment has been delivered:
in Hoffman v South African Airways49 and Minister of Health and
Others v Treatment Action Campaign.50 Sachs’ explanation of why he
cried shows both a high level of commitment to the constitutional
values and sense of empathy to victims of violations: ‘The tears had
come because of an overwhelming sense of pride at being a member
of a court that protected fundamental values and secured dignity for
all human beings.’51 According to Sachs J, this response was stirred by
his seeing in Court persons with T-shirts reading ‘HIV Positive’ and the
cheers that followed the delivery of the judgments. 
Sachs J also represented another unique aspect of South Africa’s
Constitutional Court: some judges had served as architects of the new
legal order and the values upon which it is premised. Sachs was
present at the adoption of the Freedom Charter, a document which
later became the blue print for the 1994 and 1996 constitutions.
Within the ANC, Sachs was at the forefront of advocacy for the
adoption a Bill of Rights, which some members had dismissed as a ‘Bill
of Whites’.52 His scholarly writings are proof of this sustained
commitment.53 Space and time does not allow for a review of all
Sach’s judgments. A short review, however, shows that the reasoning
48 Sachs’ response to interview questions at the Judicial Service Commission,
available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/judges/transcripts/
albertlouissachs.html.
49 2001 1 SA 1 (CC).
50 2002 5 SA 721 (CC).
51 Sachs ‘Judicial enforcement’ (n 17 above) 152 – 3.
52 See Sachs interview with JSC (n 48 above).
53 See Sachs ‘Protecting’ (n 2 above); and Sachs ‘A Bill of Rights’ (n 2 above). 
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in his judgments has in the main been directed not by black letter law
but rather by what he conceptualises as an ideal society shaped by the
values to which he is committed and worked to bring into existence.
In Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie,54 in which Sachs wrote the lead
judgment, for instance, he could have simply, and in a technical
manner, referred to sexual orientation as a ground upon which
discrimination is constitutionally prohibited. He, however, goes to
great length to ground his reasoning on what he describes as the
different family formations which have to be accepted in an evolving
South Africa. This is in addition to realising what he describes as ‘[a]
democratic, universalistic, caring and aspirationally egalitarian
society which embraces everyone and accepts people for who they
are’.55
In terms of the political struggle, Justice Zak Yacoob’s background
is similar in many respects to that of Sachs J and Chaskalson CJ. The
influence of empathy on Yacoob’s judgements in such cases as Njongi
v Member of Executive Council, Department of Welfare, Eastern
Cape56 is discussed in detail by Ellmann. As with his learned brothers
above, one could trace Yacoob’s approach on the bench back through
his career. As legal counsel, Yacoob was involved a number of criminal
trials of anti-apartheid activists. He represented the famous ‘Durban
Six’ who occupied the British Consulate in Durban in a 1984 protest
against apartheid and unjust laws.57 Although he denies being a
politician, he acknowledges his involvement in politics and his goal of
achieving democracy in South Africa.58 Yacoob was also a member of
a panel of experts advising the Constitutional Assembly in the drafting
of the Constitution and served as a commissioner in the first post
apartheid Independent Electoral Commission. 
Justice Yacoob’s profile on the Constitutional Court website has
a portion entitled ‘politics’. It lists a number of political activities in
which he has been engaged: member of the executive of the Natal
Indian Congress; member of the executive committee of the Durban
Detainees’ Support Committee and member of the executive
committee of the Durban Housing Action Committee. Membership of
the Housing Committee could explain the sense of empathy that one
sees at the opening of Justice Yacoob’s judgment in Grootboom. To
him, the case was a reminder of the intolerable conditions under
54 2006 1 SA 524 (CC)(‘Fourie’).
55 Fourie (n 54 above) para 60.
56 2008 6 BCLR 571 (CC).
57 See Yacoob’s profile at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/judges/
justicezakYacoob/index1.html.
58 Interview with the Judicial Service Commission available at http://
www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/judges/transcripts/yacoob.html.
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which many people lived, of which the petitioners were a fraction.59
Yacoob also lucidly illustrates the historical origins of the problem of
housing in the country, sketching the political design of the apartheid
housing policy.60 
3.1 Emotional adjudication and impartiality
Although Ellmann acknowledges the role of emotion, he is also
apprehensive about its potential to compromise impartiality in
judging. He partly bases his conclusion on human nature:
People become committed to particular ideas, and it becomes
impossible to persuade them to depart from those commitments. Equally
commonly, people become overwhelmed by emotions — hate, love, fear,
all of the normal range — and as a result they make judgements that are
unreasonable.61
To his question, how can judges avoid into this falling peril? Ellmann’s
answer is simply ‘fight fire with fire’ by another emotion, empathy,
which would make them feel a connection to every litigant. In my
opinion, I think Ellmann has overstated the impact of emotion on
human judgment.
As indicated by Jeremy Blumenthal, traditionally, discussions of
the role of emotions in the law have framed emotions as a
counterpoint to rational thought because of the belief that as a
corruptive force, emotions distort logical reasoning.62 While one
agrees that emotion is an unconscious process with the ability to
hijack human faculties, human capacity to control emotion, although
potentially idiosyncratic, is generally varied. Emotions can be
contained and a professional will not allow emotion to cloud reason.
Even when guided by emotion, a professional will at least find reasons
to justify the conclusions made. In this regard, one may want to
borrow from Blumenthal’s distinction and contrast of emotions and
mood:
[E]motions — anger, fear — tend to be more stable, focused, and
attributable to a particular source; moods tend to be more transient,
diffuse, and less attributable to particular sources (anxiety, elation,
depression). Generally speaking, moods, not emotions are more likely to
influence reasoning ...63 
59 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para
2 (Grootboom).
60 Grootboom (n 59 above) para 6.
61 Grootboom (n 59 above) 6.
62 Blumenthal (n 29 above) 2.
63 Blumenthal (n 29 above) 3.
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The argument here is that judges may be emotionally attached to
values, but still remain legally rational and unmoved by mood. For
example, the judges had compassion for the plaintiff in Soobramoney
and yet they could not give him what he demanded. The closing words
of Justice Sachs are illuminating in this regard: ‘If resources were co-
extensive with compassion, I have no doubt as to what my decision
would have been.’64 Indeed, even in those cases where the outcome
appears to have been influenced by empathy, the Court’s decision-
making process retains all the hallmarks of rationality. For example,
in Nyathi v Member of Executive Council,65 the Court was partly
influenced by the fact that in spite of legally being entitled to
compensation for damage arising from negligence of medical
personnel, the applicant could not afford to pay for medical care to
cater for his deteriorating health. The following statement from
Madala J is evidence of empathy on the part of Court:
The circumstances of this case show the potential that section 3 has for
the limitation of the right to dignity. The applicant was made to wait for
an extremely long time for money required to pay The state was made
fully aware of this very desperate situation but provided no relief.66 
In spite of such empathy, the Court still founded its decision on the
fact that section 3 of the State Liability Act results in discrimination
arising from the differential treatment between private judgement
debtors and the state.67 The Court also found, under section 36, that
the restriction was not reasonable and justifiable in a free and
democratic society based on equality and human dignity.68 The Court
held, quite reasonably, that not all attachment would disrupt
government services.69
It is also important to note that most judges, although committed
to a specific value or set of values, will be conscious of other
competing values. Indeed, the approach of the South African courts
suggests that they are conscious of the need to weigh competing
values and strike an appropriate balance.70 Such awareness should
force even a ‘passionate’ judge to give audience to all parties and
allow the parties to frame their arguments in terms of values that
they reckon should guide the court’s decision. 
64 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 1 SA 765 para 59.
65 [2008] ZACC 8.
66 Nyathi (n 65 above) para 45.
67 Nyathi (n 65 above) para 47.
68 Nyathi (n 65 above) para 50.
69 Nyathi (n 65 above) para 51.
70 See C Mbazira ‘Enforcement of socio-economic rights in South Africa:
Strengthening the reasonableness approach’ (2008) 26 Nordic Journal of Human
Rights 131.
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3.2 Beyond emotions 
It should be noted that in addition to the emotional commitment of
the judges, another reason that could explain the Constitutional
Court’s achievements is the ‘newness’ of the Court. In a 1999 paper,71
Iain Currie sets up Ronald Dworkin72 Hercules as a strawman in
explaining how we should best understand how newness of a court
could affect its performance. Currie — like Cass Sunstein — is
sympathetic to a ‘new’ Constitutional Court’s unwillingness to offer
thick theories that explain the basis for all its decisions. Unlike
Dworkin’s Hercules — who has the luxury of time for ‘in depth
research and reflection on a decision that more pressed courts do not
have’73 — the Constitutional Court does not have infinite amounts of
time. Currie rejects a Dworkian model that holds that judges should,
to the fullest extent possible, emulate Hercules even though
[Hercules] works so much more quickly (and has so much more time
available) that he can explore avenues and ideas [real judges] cannot;
he can pursue, not just one or two evident lines in expanding the range
of cases he studies but all the lines there are.74
As it so happens, although the roll of the Constitutional Court has
been growing every year, this Court has had a relatively light
caseload. According to Roux, this light load has allowed the Court to
pay great attention to the rhetorical construction of its judgments
and to foreign authority.75 In my opinion, however the newness and
the light load of the Court has also allowed it to build its
jurisprudence without necessarily being constrained by precedents.
Such precedents could have bound the judges and prevented them
from making decisions based on their beliefs and value commitments.
In addition, the absence of precedents has allowed the Court to easily
engage in a constitutional dialogue with foreign courts and to be
guided by foreign authorities that strengthen the emotional
commitment of the judges to certain values. As powerful as emotional
commitment to values may be, the role that approaches and
judgments from foreign jurisdictions have played in shaping South
African constitutional law jurisprudence should not be
underestimated. Like trade in goods and services, globalisation has
spurred and moved constitutional dialogue beyond the borders, in
what has been described either as ‘transjudicial dialogue’, ‘judicial
71 I Currie ‘Judicious avoidance’ (1999) 15 South African Journal on Human Rights
138.
72 R Dworkin Laws’ empire (1986).
73 Currie (n 71 above) 143.
74 Dworkin as quoted by Currie (n 73 above) 143.
75 Roux (n 43 above) 23.
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comity’,76 or as ‘transnational constitutional dialogue’.77 One
Canadian scholar has described this process as ‘“globalawzation” —
globalisation of law’.78 This trend has changed the traditional
perception that domestic commentaries, constitutions and case-law
themselves are the sole bases for analysis and interpretation of
domestic constitutions.79 This new phenomenon has been described
as one of the most remarkable legal phenomena of our times.80 It is
increasingly being used by scholars to unravel the approaches of both
domestic constitutional courts and international tribunals.81 
It should be noted, however, that reliance on foreign judicial
approaches is not an entirely new phenomena. During colonial times,
the colonised states received and relied on their colonial masters’
legal systems and judicial approaches in their entirety. What,
however, distinguishes the old from the current approach is the move
away from the process of one-way transmission to a process of
dialogue.82 The current dialogue ‘takes place at a horizontal level
without a clear-cut division between those that “export” and those
that “import” opinions or legal positions’.83
The South African Constitutional Court has become a part of this
trade – an exporter and importer of constitutional jurisprudence. A lot
could explain South Africa’s vigorous participation in the
transnational dialogue. Foremost is its Constitution: it requires the
courts, in interpreting the Bill of Rights, to follow international law
and consider foreign law.84 For example, the Constitution requires a
court to prefer any reasonable interpretation of legislation that is
consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation
that is inconsistent with international law.85 The Court has, with some
hesitation, given effect to these provisions.86 Indeed, some judges of
the Constitutional Court have proclaimed their ‘constitutional duty to
defend deep core values which are part of emerging world
jurisprudence’.87
76 MR Ferrese ‘When national actors become transnational: Transjudicial dialogue
between democracy and constitutionalism (2009) 9(1) Global Jurist 1, 2.
77 C Vicki ‘Constitutional dialogue and human dignity: States and transnational
constitutional dialogue’ (2004) 65 Montana Law Review 15. 
78 A Dodek ‘Canada as constitutional exporter: The rise of the “Canadian Model” of
constitutionalism’ (2007) 36 Supreme Court Law Review 310, 311.
79 C Moon ‘Comparative constitutional analysis: Should the United States Supreme
Court join the dialogue’ (2003) 12 Journal of Law & Policy 229.
80 Ferrese (n 76 above) 2.
81 See Vicki ‘Constitutional’ (n 77 above); Moon ‘Comparative’ (n 79 above); and
Ferrese (n 76 above)
82 Moon (n 79 above) 244, fn 115. 
83 Ferrese (n 76 above) 5.
84 Section 39(1)(b) and (c).
85 Section 233. 
86 See Makwanyane (n 7 above) para 37.
87 Sachs (n 17 above) [Emphasis supplied].
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At the same time, however, the Court is alive to the dangers of a
uncritical reliance on foreign decisions. As indicated by Ackermann J
in Fose v Minister Safety and Security,88 ‘histories of the various
constitutional dispensations are not the same’.89 Hence, although the
judge made detailed reference to United States’ jurisprudence on the
subject of damages as a constitutional remedy, he reminded himself
of the fact that the law of delict differed in various legal systems. In
the United States, it is divided along federal and state lines.90 The
Constitutional Court has also indicated awareness that South African
law, especially with respect to the protection of human rights, could
have evolved in ways which supersede foreign and international law.
Hence, in Fourie, Sachs J rejected arguments based on Article 16 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that he believed
undermined human rights. It had been argued that international law
forbade same-sex marriages on the ground that the UDHR guaranteed
the right to marry to only men and women and only protected the
‘family’. Sachs reasoned that as conditions of humanity evolve, so do
concepts of rights and that it would be strange to use principles of
international human rights law to take away a guaranteed right:
‘[t]his would be more so when the right concerned was openly,
expressly and consciously adopted by the Constitutional Assembly’.91 
Other than the provisions of the Constitution and their reception,
South African involvement in the dialogue could be given a
philosophical justification. Dodek justifies South Africa’s reliance on
Canadian jurisprudence on the basis of Canada’s foreign policy on
apartheid: ‘South Africans perceive Canada as having been a leader in
the fight against apartheid … [which has] created a milieu … that is
receptive to Canadian ideas, institutions and experts’.92 Dodek’s
argument, however, does not explain reliance on approaches from
countries that did not play any visible role in the fight against
apartheid such as Germany, Namibia, Hungary and Trinidad and
Tobago.93 
Ferrese’s ‘newcomer’ based explanation is somewhat more
compelling: ‘For newcomers, constitutional dialogue has much
greater marginal utility because of their need for legitimation
internally as well as internationally’.94 Indeed, the Court in
Makwanyane leans towards this explanation:
88 1997 (7) BCLR 851 (CC).
89 Fose (n 88 above) para 24.
90 As above.
91 Fourie (n 54 above) para 104.
92 Dodek (n 78 above) 324.
93 Moon (n 78 above) 239.
94 Ferrese (n  76 above) 20.
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Comparative ‘bill of rights’ jurisprudence will no doubt be of
importance, particularly in the early stages of the transition when there
is no developed indigenous jurisprudence in this branch of the law on
which to draw.95
Indeed, as the Court matured and built its own jurisprudence over 15
years, reliance on foreign decisions decreased. One could also argue,
in a way which reinforces Ellmann’s thesis, that the Court’s ongoing
reliance on foreign jurisprudence is an indicator of values shared
across borders. 
4 Conclusion 
Ellmann’s paper introduces a new dimension in constitutional law
discourse in South Africa: an examination of the contribution of the
psychological factors, emotion in particular, on the approach(es) the
judges have adopted. 
An examination of the professional backgrounds of some former
judges of the Constitution Court has largely proved Ellmann
contentions about the emotional commitment of the judges of this
Court. Nonetheless, a critical reading of Ellmann’s paper must be
guided by recent findings in psychology and neurology in the context
of trying to understand the relationship between law and emotion. I
would further contend that in addition to the emotional commitment
of the judges, the quick development of South Africa’s constitutional
law could be attributed to the involvement of the Constitutional Court
in an emerging transnational constitutional law dialogue. This
engagement flows from the ‘newness’ of a Court that seeks
international legitimacy and the absence a large body of domestic
precedents upon which it can draw. 
95 Makwanyane (n 7 above) para 37.
